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Abstract
Recently, adversarial deception becomes one of the
most considerable threats to deep neural networks.
However, compared to extensive research in new
designs of various adversarial attacks and defenses,
the neural networks’ intrinsic robustness property
is still lack of thorough investigation. This work
aims to qualitatively interpret the adversarial at-
tack and defense mechanism through loss visual-
ization, and establish a quantitative metric to evalu-
ate the neural network model’s intrinsic robustness.
The proposed robustness metric identifies the up-
per bound of a model’s prediction divergence in the
given domain and thus indicates whether the model
can maintain a stable prediction. With extensive
experiments, our metric demonstrates several ad-
vantages over conventional adversarial testing ac-
curacy based robustness estimation: (1) it pro-
vides an uniformed evaluation to models with dif-
ferent structures and parameter scales; (2) it over-
performs conventional accuracy based robustness
estimation and provides a more reliable evaluation
that is invariant to different test settings; (3) it can
be fast generated without considerable testing cost.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, Neural Networks (NNs) have achieved
superiors success in various domains, e.g., computer vi-
sion [Szegedy et al., 2016], speech recognition [Hinton et al.,
2012], autonomous systems [Huval et al., 2015], etc. How-
ever, the recent appearance of adversarial attacks [Kurakin et
al., 2016] greatly challenges the security of neural network
applications: by crafting and injecting human-imperceptible
noises into test inputs, neural networks’ prediction results can
be arbitrarily manipulated [Ian J. Goodfellow, 2014]. Un-
til now, the emerging pace, effectiveness, and efficiency of
new attacks always take an early lead to the defense solu-
tions [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], and the key factors of the
adversarial vulnerabilities are still unclear, leaving the neural
network robustness study in a vicious cycle.
In this work, we aim to qualitatively interpret neural net-
work models’ adversarial vulnerability and robustness, and
establish a quantitative metric for the model-intrinsic robust-
ness evaluation. To interpret the robustness, we adopt the loss
visualization technique [Goodfellow et al., 2015], which was
widely used in model convergence studies. As adversarial
attacks leverage perturbations in inputs, we switch the loss
visualization from its original parameter space into the in-
put space and illustrate how a neural network is deceived by
adversarial perturbations. Based on the interpretation, we de-
sign a robustness evaluation metric to measure a neural net-
work’s maximum prediction divergence within a constrained
perturbation range. We further optimize the metric evalu-
ation process to keep its consistency under extrinsic factor
variance, e.g., model reparameterization [Dinh et al., 2017].
Specifically, we have the following contributions:
• We interpret the adversarial vulnerability and robustness
by defining and visualizing a new loss surface called de-
cision surface. Compared to the cross-entropy based loss
surface, the decision surface contains the implicit deci-
sion boundary and provides better visualization effect;
• We testify that adversarial deception is caused by the
neural network’s neighborhood under-fitting. Our visu-
alization shows that adversarial examples are naturally-
existed points lying in the close neighborhood of the in-
puts. However, the neural network fails to classify them,
which caused the adversarial example phenomenon;
• We propose a robustness evaluation metric. Combined
with a new normalization method, the metric can invari-
antly reflect a neural network’s intrinsic robustness prop-
erty regardless of attacks and defenses;
• We reveal that under certain cases, e.g., defensive distil-
lation, the commonly-used PGD adversarial testing ac-
curacy can give unreliable robustness estimation, while
our metric could reflect the model robustness correctly.
Extensive evaluation results show that our defined robust-
ness metric could well indicate the model-intrinsic robustness
across different datasets, various architectures, multiple ad-
versarial attacks, and different defense methods.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attacks and Robustness
Adversarial examples were firstly introduced by [Szegedy et
al., 2013], which revealed neural networks’ vulnerability to
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adversarial noises and demonstrated the gap between the ar-
tificial cognition and human visual perception. Since then,
various adversarial attacks were proposed, such as L-BFGS
attack [Kurakin et al., 2016], FGSM attack [Ian J. Goodfel-
low, 2014], C&W attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], black-
box attack [Papernot et al., 2017], etc.
Driven by the appearance of adversarial attacks, corre-
sponding defense techniques also emerged, including adver-
sarial training [Ian J. Goodfellow, 2014], defensive distil-
lation [Papernot et al., 2016], gradient regularization [Ross
and Doshi-Velez, 2018], adversarial logit pairing [Kannan et
al., 2018], etc. Among those, MinMax robustness optimiza-
tion [Madry et al., 2018] is considered as one of the most
potent defenses, which boosts model accuracy by integrating
the worst-case adversarial examples into the model training.
Currently, testing accuracy under adversarial attacks is
used to evaluate the model robustness. However, it is highly
affected by the attack specifications and can’t comprehen-
sively reflect the actual robustness regarding model-intrinsic
properties. For example, one commonly used way to evalu-
ate the model robustness is adopting the testing accuracy un-
der projected gradient descent (PGD) attack as an estimation.
However, our experiments demonstrate that such a robustness
estimation is highly unreliable: a model with a high PGD test-
ing accuracy could be easily broken by other attacks.
In this work, we aim to provide an intrinsic robustness
property evaluation metric that is invariant from the speci-
fications of models, attacks, and defenses.
2.2 Neural Network Loss Visualization
Neural network loss visualization is considered as one of the
most useful approaches in neural network analysis own to
its intuitive interpretation. Proposed by [Goodfellow et al.,
2015], the loss visualization is utilized to analyze model train-
ing and convergence. Later, [Keskar et al., 2017] further re-
vealed that flat local minima is the key to model generaliza-
tion in parameter space. However, a model reparameteriza-
tion issue was identified by [Dinh et al., 2017] that the model
parameter scaling may distort the geometry properties.
In this work, we adopt the concept of the loss visualiza-
tion to analyze the neural network’s loss behaviors under ad-
versarial perturbations. Meanwhile, we will also provide a
normalization method to solve the model reparameterization
problem and derive our scaling-invariant robustness metric.
2.3 Visualization Space Selection
Besides of solving the reparameterization issue, the loss visu-
alization needs further customization for the adversarial per-
turbation analysis. As the loss visualization mainly evaluates
a neural network’s generalization ability, it focuses on the pa-
rameter space to analyze the model training and convergence
in previous works. However, such an analysis focus doesn’t
fit well in the adversarial attacks and defenses, whose action
scope is in input space. On the other hand, loss function in
the input space measures the network’s loss variations w.r.t
the input perturbations. It naturally shows the influence of
adversarial perturbations and is suitable for studying the ro-
bustness to adversarial perturbations. Therefore, we extend
the previous methods into the input space.
(b) ResNet’s loss surface 
in input space*
(a) ResNet’s loss surface 
in parameter space*
* The magnitude of the two surfaces
indicates the loss value, while the
left surfaces changes with neural
network parameters (e.g. weights
and biases update), and the right
surface changes with input variation
(e.g. noises on test images).
Figure 1: (a) ResNet’s Loss Surface in Parameter Space (b) ResNet’s
Loss Surface in the Input Space: The loss surface demonstrates sig-
nificant non-smooth variation.
Fig. 1 showed two examples of the visualized loss surface
of an ResNet model in the parameter space and the input
space, which illustrate the difference between the two visu-
alization spaces. Although the loss surface in the parame-
ter space can show a flat minima, its significant non-smooth
variations in the input space demonstrate the loss is highly
sensitive to input perturbations, which can be adversarial vul-
nerabilities. In this work, we will adopt the input space as the
default visualization setting for robustness interpretation.
3 Adversarial Robustness Interpretation
In this section, we will use the customized loss visualization
to reveal the mechanism of adversarial perturbation and neu-
ral network robustness.
3.1 Neural Network Loss Visualization
Loss Visualization Basis: The prediction of a neural net-
work can be evaluated by its loss function F (θ, x), where
θ is the model parameter set (weight and bias) and x is the
input. As the inputs x are usually constructed in a high-
dimensional space, direct visualization analysis on the loss
surface is impossible. To solve this issue, the loss visual-
ization projects the high-dimensional loss surface into a low-
dimensional space to visualize it (e.g. a 2D hyper-plane).
During the projection, two vectors α and β are selected and
normalized as the base vectors for x-y hyper-plane. Given an
starting input point o, the points around it can be interpolated,
and the corresponding loss values can be calculated as:
V (i, j, α, β) = F (o+ i · α+ j · β), (1)
where, the original point o in the function F denotes the orig-
inal image, α and β can be treated as the unit perturbation
added into the image, and the coordinate (i, j) denotes the
perturbation intensity. In the loss visualization, a point’s co-
ordinate also denotes its divergence degree from the origi-
nal point along α and β direction. After sampling sufficient
points’ loss values, the function F with high-dimensional in-
puts could be projected to the chosen hyper-plane.
Decision Surface Construction: As the loss visualization
is mostly used to analyze model convergence, the loss func-
tion F (θ, x) is usually represented by the cross-entropy loss,
which constructs a conventional loss surface in the visual-
ization. However, one critical limitation of the cross-entropy
based loss surface is that, it cannot qualitatively show the ex-
plicit decision boundary of one input test, and less helpful for
adversarial deception analysis.
Therefore, we propose a decision surface to replace the
loss surface in the loss visualization:
S(x) = Z(x)t −max{Z(x)i, i 6= t}, (2)
where, Z(x) is the logit output before the softmax layer, and
t is the true class index of the input x. The decision func-
tion S(x) evaluates the confidence of prediction. In the cor-
rect prediction cases, S(x) should always be positive, while
S(x) < 0 denotes a wrong prediction. Specifically, S(x) = 0
indicates the equal confidence for both correct and wrong pre-
diction, which is the decision boundary of model. Conse-
quently, the visualization surface constructed by the function
S(x) is defined the decision. Different from the cross-entropy
based loss surface, the decision surface demonstrates explicit
decision boundaries, and assist the adversarial analysis.
3.2 Visualizing Adversarial Vulnerability
Experimental Analysis: Based on the loss visualization, we
project a neural network’s loss behavior into 2D hyper-planes.
By comparing the model’s 4 different types loss behavior in
decision surface, we provide a experimental analysis for the
adversarial vulnerability.
As shown in Fig. 2, the visualized hyper-planes have the
central points ast the original neural network inputs, and their
x-axes share the same input divergence direction – α. Mean-
while, each hyper-plane has a dedicated input divergence di-
rection – β along the y-axis, which indicate 4 kinds of per-
turbations, including random noise, cross-entropy based non-
targeted FGSM attack [Kurakin et al., 2016], Least-likely tar-
geted FGSM attack [Kurakin et al., 2016], and non-targeted
C&W attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. Specifically β val-
ues in the three adversarial attacks can be determined as:
β0 = sign(N(µ = 0, σ = 1)),
β1 = sign(−∇x yt · log(softmax(Z))),
β2 = sign(∇x yl · log(softmax(Z))),
β3 = sign(∇x max{Z(x)i, i 6= t} − Z(x)t),
(3)
whereN is normal distribution, Z is the logit output, yt is the
true class label, yl is least likely class label (both one-hot).
In Fig. 2, we use arrows to show the shortest distance
to cross the decision boundary L(x)=0. As projected in
Fig. 2(a), when the input is diverged by the perturbation along
a random direction, it will take much longer distance to cross
the decision boundary. This explains the common sense that
natural images with small random noises won’t degrade neu-
ral network accuracy significantly. By contrast, for the ad-
versarial attacks projected in Fig. 2(b)∼(d), the attacks find
aggressive directions (β direction shown in y-axis), towards
which the decision boundary is in the close neighborhood
around the original input. Therefore, adding those small per-
turbations that even human can’t perceive into input can mis-
lead the model decision and generates adversarial examples.
Vulnerability Interpretation: The above experimental anal-
ysis reveals the nature of adversarial examples: Although a
neural network seems to converge well after the model train-
ing (the demonstrated model achieves 90% accuracy on CI-
FAR10), there still exist large regions of image points that
the neural network fails to classify correctly (as shown by the
large regions beyond the decision boundary in Fig. 2(b)∼(d)).
What’s worse, some of these regions are extremely close to
the original input point (even within `inf < 1 distance).
(b) Cross Entropy (c) Least-Likely (d) C&W(a) Random
Figure 2: Adversarial vulnerability demonstration when loss surface
in input space is projected onto different hyperplanes.
Base on these analysis, we could conclude that, rather than
being “generated” by attackers, the adversarial examples are
“naturally existed” already that models fail to learn correctly.
To fix such intrinsic vulnerability of neural networks, the es-
sential and ultimate robustness enhancement should focus on
solving the “neighborhood under-fitting” issue.
3.3 Interpreting Adversarial Robustness
To verify our geometric robustness theory, we compare two
pairs of robust and natural models trained on MNIST and
CIFAR10 respectively. These models are released from the
adversarial attacking challenges 12, and built with the same
structure but different robustness degrees (natural training
and MinMax training [Madry et al., 2018]).
To verify our theory, we visualize the models’ decision sur-
faces for interpretation: (1) As shown in Fig. 3, dramatic dif-
ferences between the natural and robust decision surfaces can
be observed: Natural (vulnerable) model’s decision surfaces
show sharp peaks and large slopes, where the decision con-
fidence could quickly drop to negative areas (wrong classifi-
cation regions). (2) By comparison, on robust decision sur-
faces (shown in Fig. 3(c)(d)), all neighborhood points around
the original input point are located on a high plateau with
L(x) > 0 (correct classification regions). (3) The surface in
the neighborhood is rather flat with negligible slopes until it
reaches approximately `∞ = 0.3 constraints, which is exactly
the adversarial attack constraint used in robust training. Sim-
ilar phenomenon could be observed in Fig. 4 on CIFAR10.
Such robust model’s loss geometry verifies our previous
conclusion that, fixing the neighborhood under-fitting issue
is the essential robustness enhancement solution for neural
networks. And a flat and wide plateau around the original
point on decision surface is one of the most desired properties
of a robust model.
4 Adversarial Robustness Evaluation
4.1 Formal Definition of Robustness Metric
As aforementioned, the decision surface of a robust model
should have a flat neighborhood around the input point x. In-
tuitively explanation is that a robust model should have good
prediction stability–its prediction does not have significant
change with small perturbations. In fact, models are not al-
ways robust–the predictions of a model on clean and noisy
inputs are not always the same and can diverge to a large
extent with small adversarial noises. As such, given a fea-
sible perturbation set, the maximum divergence between the
original prediction and the worst-case adversarial prediction
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist challenge
2https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10 challenge
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Natural Model Adversarial Accuracy: 1.3% Robust Model Adversarial Accuracy: 96.8%
Figure 3: Decision surfaces of the natural and robust models on
MNIST. (a)-(b): natural model surfaces in random and adversarial
projection; (c)-(d): robust model surfaces in random and adversarial
projection (each unit denotes 0.05 perturbation step size)
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Natural Model Adversarial Accuracy: 0.3% Robust Model Adversarial Accuracy: 44.7%
Figure 4: Decision Surface of natural and robust model on CIFAR10
(step size = 1). As assumed, natural model’s surface shows sharp
peaks and cliffs while robust model’s shows flat plateau.
could be used to denote the model’s vulnerability degree (i.e.,
the inverses of model robustness).
Based on this definition, firstly, we calculate the divergence
between two predictions on an original input and an adversar-
ial input with perturbations in a defined range. Specifically,
we use the Kullback–Leibler divergence, which is known as
KL Divergence (DKL) and is a common evaluation metric
on measuring the divergence between two probability distri-
butions. The formal robustness could be estimated by:
ψ(x) =
1
max
δ∈set
DKL(P (x), P (x+ δ))
, (4)
where P (·) is the prediction results from the evaluated model.
A lower divergence DKL indicates the model is more ro-
bust as a more stable prediction is maintained. The final ro-
bustness metric ψ(x) is defined inversely proportional to the
maximumDKL since the largest divergence will generate the
smallest robustness score ψ(x). To obtain the max term in
Eq. 4, we use the gradient ascent algorithm to directly op-
timize the KL-divergence, which demonstrates accurate and
stable estimations that we will show in Sec. 5.
4.2 Invariant Normalization against
Model Reparameterization
The robustness metric defined in previous works has a prob-
lem called “model re-parameterization”: on the condition that
weights and biases are enlarged by the same coefficients si-
multaneously, a neural network model’s prediction results
and its robustness property will not change, while the defined
KL divergence can have dramatic change [Dinh et al., 2017].
To solve this problem, we design a simple but effective nor-
malization method: the basic idea is to add a scale-invariant
normalization layer after the logit layer output. Since the
neural network before the logit layer is piecewise-linear, we
could then use normalization to safely remove the scaling ef-
fect of model reparameterization. The basic process is as fol-
lows: firstly, we attain a confidence vector of the logit layer,
which can contain either positive or negative values; then we
divide them by the max-absolute-value to normalize the con-
fidence vector to the range of (-1, 1) and re-center them into
positive range (0, 2). Owning to the max division, the final
confidence vector will not change even when the parameters
are linearly scaled up (or down). Finally, we use a simple
sum-normalization to transform the confidence vector to a
valid probability distribution. The overall normalization is:
P (x) =
F˜ (x)∑
i F˜ (xi)
, F˜ (x) =
F (x)
max |F (x)| + 1. (5)
Here P (x) is the final normalized probability distribution, F˜
is the normalized confidence vector, F (x) is the original logit
layer output, and x is the input. By the above normalization
method, we could successfully alleviate the model reparame-
terization effect, which is shown in Sec. 5.
5 Robustness Evaluation Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our proposed robustness metric
in various experimental settings and compare it with conven-
tional evaluation based on adversarial testing accuracy.
5.1 Experiment Setup
To test the generality of our metric for neural networks’ ro-
bustness evaluation, we adopt three common datasets (i.e.
MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet) and different models for
the experiment, including FcNet, LeNet, ConvNet, ResNet18,
ResNet152, and DenseNet.
To further test our metric on neural networks with dif-
ferent robustness degrees, the following defense settings are
applied: No Defense, Adversarial Training [Kurakin et al.,
2016], Gradient Regularization Training [Ross and Doshi-
Velez, 2018], Defensive Distillation [Papernot et al., 2016],
Gradient Inhibition [Liu et al., 2018] and MinMax Train-
ing [Madry et al., 2018]3.
Correspondingly, the robustness verification is based on
referencing the adversarial testing accuracies from two cur-
rently strongest attacks: 30-step PGD (PGD-30) attack based
on cross-entropy loss and 30-step CW (CW-30) attacks based
on C&W loss. The adversarial perturbations are constrained
by the `∞-norm as 0.3/1.0, 8.0/255.0, 16.0/255.0 on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet respectively.
5.2 Robustness Metric Evaluation
MNIST Experiments: On MNIST dataset, the results are
shown in Table 1: (1) The results firstly demonstrate that our
metric could well reflect different robustness degrees on the
same neural network model. For example, three FcNet mod-
els show increasing robustness in ψ(x), which aligns well
3The gradient regularization and MinMax training is re-
implemented with Pytorch, which may cause small deviations from
the original reported accuracy.
Table 1: Robustness Metric Evaluation on MNIST
Model Defense ψ(x)
PGD-30
Accuracy
C&W-30
Accuracy
FcNet
No Defense 73.36 0.73% 0.2%
AdvTrain 80.43 4.43% 2.12%
MinMax 297.2 82.9% 80.3%
LeNet
No Defense 93.8 2.82% 1.01%
AdvTrain 264.7 51.8% 46.2%
MinMax 958.4 92.3% 90.3%
*AdvTrain: [Kurakin et al., 2016], MinMax: [Madry et al., 2018].
with their reference accuracies from both PGD-30 and CW-
30 attack; (2) The results also show the generality of our met-
ric on FcNet and LeNet models.
CIFAR10 Experiments: Table 2 shows the experimental
results on CIFAR10, including three common neural network
models (i.e. ConvNet, ResNet18, and DenseNet), as well as
three robustness settings (i.e. No defense, Gradient Regular-
ization, and MinMax Training). The experiment results show
that our metric has the same scale with the referenced adver-
sarial testing accuracies, implying our metric’s good general-
ity on complex neural network models and different defenses.
To better illustrate a neural network model’s robustness,
we visualized three ResNet18 models with different robust-
ness degrees in Fig. 5. As the robustness degree increases,
the models’ loss surfaces become more and more smooth.
Our empirical visualization results imply that the smoother
decision surface in the input space indicates better adversar-
ial robustness, which coincidentally matches the parameter
space generalization hypothesis [Keskar et al., 2017].
ImageNet Experiments: In the experiment on MNIST and
CIFAR10, our proposed robustness metric aligns well with
adversarial testing accuracies of PGD-30 and CW-30. How-
ever, when we evaluate the MinMax model on ImageNet, two
reference accuracies demonstrate certain inconsistency:
The MinMax model is released as the base model of the
state-of-the-art defense on ImageNet by [Xie et al., 2018].
To conduct the MinMax training, the reported time needed
is about 52 hours on 128 V100 GPUs. Despite that, the re-
ported accuracy showed very good robustness estimation of
the model, which can achieve 42.6% under 2000-iteration
PGD attacks. However, when we more thoroughly evaluated
the model by CW-30 attack, we found the model’s testing ac-
curacy is only 12.5% under the attack.
We call such a case as “unreliable estimation” in PGD-
based adversarial testing, whose robustness estimation cannot
generalize to all attacks. We will discuss this case and several
other similar ones in details in Sec. 5.3, and reveal the current
(a) Natural Model
(PGD-30 Acc: 0.0%)
(b) Gradient Regularized Model
(PGD-30 Acc: 18.72%)
(c) MinMax Training Model
(PGD-30 Acc: 44.3%)
Figure 5: Different models’ loss visualizations: model with higher
robustness demonstrates more smooth and stable geometry.
Table 2: Robustness Metric Evaluation on CIFAR10
Model Defense ψ(x)
PGD-30
Accuracy
C&W-30
Accuracy
ConvNet
No Defense 58.3 0.0% 0.0%
GradReg 86.5 16.0% 14.8%
MinMax 182.6 39.6% 38.7%
ResNet18
No Defense 67.9 0.0% 0.0%
GradReg 77.8 18.7% 17.5%
MinMax 162.7 44.3% 43.1%
DenseNet
No Defense 59.1 0.1% 0.0%
GradReg 77.9 18.6% 17.2%
MinMax 142.4 39.1% 38.8%
*GradReg: [Ross and Doshi-Velez, 2018], MinMax: [Madry et al., 2018].
deficiency of adversarial testing based robustness estimation.
5.3 Our Metric vs. Adversarial Testing Accuracy
As mentioned above, the adversarial testing accuracy from
different adversarial attacks may demonstrate certain incon-
sistency, and therefore mislead the robustness estimation. In
addition to the ImageNet example, we also include another
two cases that the adversarial testing accuracies yield unreli-
able robustness estimation: defensive distillation [Papernot et
al., 2016] and gradient inhibition [Liu et al., 2018].
To demonstrate the unreliability of these cases, we train
three new models on MNIST and CIFAR10 respectively, us-
ing natural training, defensive distillation, and gradient inhi-
bition methods. For the ImageNet model, we use a public
released model 4, which can achieve a state-of-the-art accu-
racy 45.5% against PGD-30 attack (within `∞ ≤ 16/255).
The overall experimental results are shown in Table. 3,
which shown that though all these defenses can achieve high
PGD-30 adversarial testing accuracy, they actually bring very
limited robustness improvement:
On MNIST and CIFAR10, the distillation and gradient
inhibition defenses provide the models with high adversar-
ial testing accuracy against both FGSM and PGD-30 attacks
(even higher than state-of-the-art MinMax methods), which
seemly indicates these models are significantly robust. How-
ever, when measured by our metric, we have the opposite
conclusion: these models are merely as robust as no-defense
models and incomparable to the robust models trained by
MinMax. To further verify this conclusion, we test these
models with more adversarial settings and the testing accu-
racy dramatically degrades to almost zero in all the tests.
The tests above further prove our statement: the adversar-
ial testing accuracy based on PGD-30 may yield unreliable
robustness estimation, which cannot reflect the model’s in-
trinsic robustness. This is because the distillation and gra-
dient inhibition both rely on the input gradient vanishing to
achieve robustness enhancement, which is mainly provided
by the nonlinear softmax and negative log loss. Since C&W
attack doesn’t rely on the cross-entropy loss, it can easily
crack those two defenses. Such a case also applies to the
ImageNet model trained with MinMax defenses as shown in
the last two rows of Table. 3.
4MinMax model is obtained in following link: https://github.com
/facebookresearch/imagenet-adversarial-training.
Table 3: Unreliable Cases of Adversarial Testing Accuracy
Dataset Defense
FGSM
Accuracy
PGD-30
Accuracy
ψ(x)
C&W-30
Accuracy
MNIST
No Defense 23.4% 3.5% 89.8 0.5%
Distillation 97.3%* 97.1%* 70.5 0.0%
GradInhib 98.3%* 97.8%* 87.0 0.0%
MinMax 98.3% 92.3% 958.4 90.3%
CIFAR10
No Defense 7.6% 0.1% 58.3 0.0%
Distillation 72.6%* 72.3%* 60.5 0.0%
GradInhib 79.8%* 79.7%* 70.0 0.1%
MinMax 55.7% 39.6% 182.6 38.7%
ImageNet
No Defense 15.5% 7.3% 1.7×105 4.6%
MinMax 46.9% 45.7% 2.3×105 12.5%
*Distillation: [Papernot et al., 2016], GradInhib: [Liu et al., 2018], MinMax: [Madry
et al., 2018] *Bold accuracies denote the unreliable robustness estimation cases.
In contrast, our robustness metric can successfully reflect
the model true robustness property with different defenses.
Under all the above cases, the robustness metric gives reli-
able robustness estimation, remaining un-affected by defense
methods and the unreliable PGD adversarial testing accuracy.
5.4 Reparemeterization Invariance Evaluation
The reliability of our proposed metric is also reflected in its
invariance from the model parameter scaling.
Previous work [Keskar et al., 2017] tried to define a met-
ric, named -sharpness, to evaluate the loss surface’s geom-
etry properties. We adopt its original definition and apply it
into our input space to evaluate sharpness of input space loss
surface, which can empirically reflect the adversarial gener-
alization as aforementioned.
The experiment results are shown in Table. 4, where 
denotes the -sharpness, ψs denotes our robustness metric
based on softmax layer without normalization, and ψn de-
notes our robustness metric with normalization. For the test
cases, Org. indicates the tests with the original model without
reparemeterization, *100 and /100 denote the model’s logit
layer weights and biases are scaled accordingly. Please note
that, such scaling won’t introduce accuracy and robustness
change in practice [Dinh et al., 2017].
The experiments show that, both -sharpness and un-
normalized ψs give very distinct robustness estimations in-
fluenced by the reparameterization. By contrast, the normal-
ization method successfully alleviates the scaling influence
and enables our metric ψn to keep a stable estimation under
model reparameterization. Therefore, our metric could thus
be used to more precisely capture one model’s robustness de-
gree without being affected by model reparameterization.
5.5 Efficiency of the Robustness Metric
Here we show the efficiency of our metric compared to ad-
versarial testing methods. Since we are evaluating the model
properties, theoretically it should be invariant to how many
input we choose. Here we show that as the test-batch-size in-
creases, the calculated robustness metric gradually converge
to a stable robustness estimation which is close to the whole
test set average robustness. Fig. 6 shows the relation with
Table 4: Robustness Metrics Comparison under Reparemeterization
Model Metric
No Defense Model MinMax Model
Org. *100 /100 Org. *100 /100
ConvNet
 22.7 109.6 0.095 0.43 3.20 0.004
ψs 0.96 0.012 1677.8 39.6 5.33 377443.3
ψn 58.3 59.5 57.9 182.5 183.1 177.36
ResNet18
 15.4 87.4 0.048 0.085 5.63 0.005
ψs 0.963 0.0097 3178.8 17.11 0.158 128089
ψn 110.9 110.8 102.5 193.0 192.62 172.5
the batch size and the robustness deviation between batches
with same batch-size. We can see that on both datasets,
as the batch size increases, the robustness measurement be-
come more accurate since they have much smaller deviations.
With the batch-size equals to 1000 (or less), we could get the
model’s robustness estimation with less than 10% deviation
on MNIST and 5% on CIFAR10, which demonstrate higher
efficiency than accuracy testing running on the whole test set.
5.6 Robustness Estimation Grading
Based on our experiments, we could derive a rough relation-
ship between different robustness evaluation score and the ad-
versarial accuracy. For example, on MNIST dataset within
common threat model (`∞ < 0.3), we can define the model
robustness by three levels: Vulnerable (acc < 0.3), Fairly
Robust (0.3 ≤ acc < 0.6) and Robust (0.6 ≤ acc ≤ 1.0).
In such a case, the corresponding robust metric range will
be (0, 100), (100, 270), (270, ∞), which could be used to
quickly grade a neural network’s robustness. The robustness
grading for CIFAR and ImageNet cannot be well developed
yet due to the limited robustness currently (40% and 15%).
6 Conclusion
In this work, through visualizing and interpreting neural net-
works’ decision surface in input space, we show that adver-
sarial examples are essentially caused by neural networks’
neighborhood under-fitting issue. Oppositely, robust mod-
els manage to smoothen their neighborhood and relieve such
under-fitting effect. Guided by such observation, we pro-
pose a model intrinsic robustness evaluation metric based on
the model predictions’ maximum KL-divergence in a given
neighborhood constrain. Combined with our new-designed
normalization layer, the robustness metric shows multiple ad-
vantages than previous methods, including: great general-
ity across dataset/models/attacks/defenses, invariance under
reparameterization, and excellent computing efficiency.
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
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Figure 6: The robustness measurement is increasingly stable with
the increasing batch size (100 to 1000).
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